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II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the case
A jury found Kenneth Thurlow guilty of first-degree murder.  The court
imposed a fixed life sentence.  His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct
appeal.  State v. Thurlow, 152 Idaho 256, 257, 269 P.3d 813, 814 (Ct. App. 2011). 
He then filed a petition for post-conviction relief.  This is an appeal from the
judgment dismissing that petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.  Relief
should be granted because Mr. Thurlow presented a prima facie claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel by showing that: 1) she advised Mr. Thurlow to decline a
settlement agreement where the state would recommend a ten-year fixed sentence
because she believed that Mr. Thurlow would only be convicted of a lesser charge
and 2) that Mr. Thurlow would have accepted the offer had he not been misinformed
by counsel. 
B. Procedural history
1.  The criminal trial
The state filed a criminal complaint alleging that Mr. Thurlow had
committed the crime of murder in the first degree by shooting Christopher West in
the head with a shotgun.  R., pg. 25-26.  The State also alleged that Christopher
Lewers committed first degree murder in the death of Mr. West by aiding and
abetting Mr. Thurlow.  State v. Thurlow, supra.   Mr. Lewers pleaded guilty to the
charge and the state agreed to recommend a determinate sentence of not more than
  The trial transcripts were attached to the Amended Petition for Post-1
Conviction Relief and are in the record as Exhibit A.  The Supreme Court also took
judicial notice of the transcripts.  R 202.
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twenty years.  The district court sentenced Mr. Lewers to life imprisonment with
twenty years fixed.  State v. Lewers, No. 34900 (Ct. App. 2008) (unpublished).  Mr.
Thurlow went to trial.
At the trial, evidence showed that the police began investigating the death of
Christopher West, whose body was found at the Evergreen Towing yard, on the
morning of August 21, 2005.  Tr., pg. 332, l. 3 - pg. 348, l. 8.   Mr. West died from a1
shotgun wound to his head from a .410 shotgun.  Tr.,  pg. 639, l. 4 - pg. 648, l. 5; pg.
743, l. 24 - pg. 818, l. 17.  Kurt Lewers, Chris Lewers’ father, owned a .410 shotgun
which was stolen from his house while he was working out of state.  Tr., pg. 712, l.
22 - pg. 729, l. 10.  Andrea Cordle, Kurt Lewers’ daughter and Chris Lewers’ sister,
had a key to the residence and took care of the animals and Chris Lewers took care
of the yard while Kurt Lewers was out of state.  Tr., pg. 698, l. 13 - pg. 729, l. 10. 
The thief broke into the house by reaching through a doggie door unlocking the
front door, kicked in Mr. Lewers’ bedroom door, and then stole only a jar of change
and the .410 shotgun.  Tr., pg. 698, l. 13 - pg. 729, l. 10; pg. 717, l. 11-15.
Tina Mongan testified that Ken Thurlow and Chris Lewers came to her place
on the night of August 20, 2005, and the three took methamphetamine.  Tr., pg.
662, l. 2 - pg. 670, l. 1.  Mr. Lewers attempted to sell Ms. Mongan a .410 shotgun,
which she declined.  Tr., pg. 676, l. 18 - pg. 677, l. 24.  Ms. Mongan asked Mr.
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Thurlow to pick her up some gasoline and muratic acid, the two left, and returned a
couple of hours later.  Tr., pg. 678, l. 7 - pg. 679, l. 9.  When they returned, Mr.
Lewers had a cut over his eye and was not wearing the same clothes, while Mr.
Thurlow was wearing the same overalls that he was wearing earlier.  Tr., pg. 671, l.
18 - pg. 672, l. 11.  Mr. Thurlow explained that Mr. Lewers’ cut resulted from him
getting hit.  Tr., pg. 673, l. 17-21.
Donny Dixon testified that he is in essence a caretaker at Evergreen Towing
and that he lives on the property.  Tr., pg. 573, l. 8 - pg. 575, l. 1.  Mr. Dixon
testified that Christopher West was at Evergreen Towing twice on the day he died. 
Tr., pg. 575, l. 13 - pg. 578, l. 23.  Mr. Dixon testified that on that same night Mr.
Thurlow walked up to him and asked him for some muratic acid.  Tr., pg. 578, l. 24 -
pg. 579, l. 11.  Mr. Dixon then went to his trailer to get the muratic acid - he
thought Mr. Thurlow had gone at least part of the way with him.  Tr., pg. 581, l. 12
- pg. 583, l. 5.  After Mr. Dixon looked through his trailer, but could not find the
muratic acid, Mr. Thurlow walked up to the door and told him that Mr. West was
dead.  Tr., pg. 583, l. 7-22.  Mr. Dixon did not believe him, they walked over to
where Mr. West lay and Mr. Dixon saw his body.  Tr., pg. 583, l. 23 - pg. 584, l. 19. 
When he walked over to the body, Mr. Dixon noticed that there was another person
there who had a long coat on, as did Mr. Thurlow, and it looked to Mr. Dixon that
the other person was holding a weapon.  Tr., pg. 585, l.14-24.  
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Mr. Dixon said that Mr. Thurlow suggested that they load Mr. West’s body
into the truck that Mr. West was working on, but he stated that it would not run. 
Tr., pg. 584, l. 21 - pg. 585, l. 13.  Mr. Dixon then testified as follows:
Q. Then what happens?
A. Well, this guy, he had something under his coat.  And there was a big tree
here.  I sort of, no, man, I want nothing to do with this as I walked around this way,
because he looked like he was wanting to get me in the line of fire, you know,
without shooting Kenny.  So I walked around this way, the tree and everything, and
Kenny was right about there.
Q. So Kenny Thurlow moved back here near where you were then?
A. Yeah, I walked around this tree.
Q. Right, you went around the tree but Thurlow came back and met up with
you?
A. Yeah.
Tr., pg. 587, l. 9-21.  
Mr. Dixon then agreed that he would leave on his bike, Mr. Thurlow and Mr.
Lewers would leave, Mr. Dixon would return in the morning and call the police.  Tr.,
pg. 589, l. 1 - pg. 596, l.12. 
When serving a search warrant, the police found in Mr. Thurlow’s bedroom,
among other items, the .410 shotgun and a large shirt with blood on it that was
eventually proven to have come from Mr. West.  Tr., pg. 398, l. 12 - pg. 400, l. 4; pg.
421, l. 21 - pg. 422, l. 18; pg. 1022, l. 14 - pg. 1024, l. 3.  
Michael Thurlow, Kenny Thurlow’s son testified that Chris Lewers was their
neighbor and that he had access to Kenny Thurlow’s locked bedroom and that he
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had found him “all the time” in the bedroom without Kenny Thurlow, including a
couple of days before they were arrested.  Tr., pg. 1080, l. 10 - pg. 1085, l. 19.  
Mr. Thurlow testified.  Tr., pg. 1164, l. 8.  He denied shooting Mr. West, but
stated that he saw Chris Lewers holding a shotgun while standing over Mr. West's
body.  Tr., pg.1164, l. 25 - pg. 1165, l. 7.  Mr. Thurlow testified that he had seen Mr.
West at Evergreen towing earlier in the day.  Tr., pg. 1165, l. 15 - pg. 1166, l. 23. 
He went back to his apartment, met up with Mr. Lewers, and the two went to Ron
Anderson’s, a neighbor of Tina Mongan, so that Mr. Lewers could collect on a drug
debt from Mr. Anderson.  Tr., pg. 1167, l. 4 - pg. 1169, l. 13.  While Mr. Lewers met
with Mr. Anderson, Mr. Thurlow visited with Ms. Mongan.  Tr., pg. 1169, l. 25 - pg.
1170, l. 22.  Mr. Lewers returned about 20 minutes later.  Tr., pg. 1171, l. 2-4.
Mr. Thurlow testified that upon his return, Mr. Lewers attempted to sell Ms.
Mongan the .410 shotgun, a weapon that Mr. Lewers had shown Mr. Thurlow a few
days earlier when he tried to sell it to him.  Tr., pg. 1171, l. 8-20.  That was the first
time Mr. Thurlow had seen the .410 that night.  Tr., p. 1171, l. 21-23.  Upon Ms.
Mongan’s requests, Mr. Thurlow and Mr. Lewers went to buy her some gasoline and
to get some muratic acid from Donny Dixon.  Tr., pg. 1172, l.10 - pg. 1173, l.11. 
When they arrived at Evergreen towing, Mr. Thurlow tied an unloaded 12 gauge
shotgun with a shoestring, wrapped the shoestring around his shoulder, put it
under his clothing, and took it to see if Mr. Dixon wanted it because he had
complained of people coming onto the property and raising havoc.  Tr., pg. 1175, l. 4
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- pg. 1179, l. 13.  Mr. Thurlow began looking for Mr. Dixon and Mr. Lewers followed
him.  Tr., pg. 1179, l.18 - pg. 1180, l. 10.  Mr. Thurlow went up to Mr. Dixon’s door,
Mr. Dixon was not there, then Mr. Thurlow walked to the shop and he noticed that
Mr. West was at Evergreen Towing.  Tr., pg. 1181, l. 11 - pg. 1182, l.8.  Mr. Thurlow
went and found Mr. Dixon in the shop, he asked him if he had any muratic acid to
which Mr. Dixon indicated that he did, and they began walking back towards Mr.
Dixon's trailer.  Tr., pg. 1182, l. 12-24. 
Mr. Thurlow then noticed that Mr. West and Mr. Lewers were fighting.  Tr.,
pg. 1182, l. 24 - pg. 1183, l. 20.  Mr. Thurlow admitted that he tried to break up the
fight, first verbally, and then by hitting Mr. West on the head with the butt of his
shotgun - Mr. Lewers was also struck above the eye.  Tr., pg. 1183, l. 21 - pg. 1185,
l. 5.)  Mr. West took off running and Mr. Lewers chased him.  Tr., pg. 1185, l. 17-23. 
Mr. Thurlow then heard Mr. West yell “Donny,” and heard a boom.  Tr., pg. 1188, l.
9-12. He saw Mr. Lewers standing over Mr. West and heard him say that Mr. West
should not have yelled.  Tr., pg. 1188, l. 12-16.
Mr. Lewers then told Mr. Thurlow that, “where I come from the other guy is
on you” meaning that he wanted Mr. Thurlow to kill Mr. Dixon which Mr. Thurlow
refused to do.  Tr., pg. 1189, l. 11-16.  Mr. Thurlow went to Mr. Dixon and told him
that Mr. West was dead and asked him what he wanted them to do.  Tr., pg. 1189, l.
16 - pg. 1190, l. 12.  After Mr. Dixon saw Mr. West’s body, they discussed putting
Mr. West’s body in his truck, but Mr. Dixon said the truck was not running.  Tr., pg.
7
1190, l. 13-24.  Mr. Thurlow asked Mr. Dixon to be the lookout in order to get him
away from there because he didn't want Mr. Lewers to shoot Mr. Dixon.  Tr., pg.
1191, l. 19 - pg. 1192, l. 10.
Mr. Thurlow and Mr. Lewers returned to Ms. Mongan’s residence where Mr.
Lewers sold items stolen from Mr. West’s truck to a friend of Ms. Mongan’s, Kevin
Bettis.  Tr., pg. 687, l. 8 - pg. 693, l. 15; pg. 1194, l. 22 - pg. 1195, l. 5; pg. 1200, l. 11
- pg. 1201, l. 3.  Although he owned the shirt, Mr. Thurlow testified that Mr. Lewers
was wearing the shirt that was ultimately found to have Mr. West’s blood on it.  Tr.,
pg. 1192, l. 23 - pg. 1193, l. 13.  A couple of days later, Mr. Lewers brought the .410
over to Mr. Thurlow’s apartment and asked him to get rid of it, which Mr. Thurlow
refused to do, but he did not give the shotgun back to Mr. Lewers because “[i]f it
was in my home, I knew that he didn’t have it.”  Tr., pg. 1208, l. 7 - pg. 1209, l. 13. 
Mr. Thurlow testified that he did not know that Mr. West was going to be at
Evergreen Towing and that he, himself, did not plan on going over there until Ms.
Mongan asked him to get some muratic acid.  Tr., pg. 1219, l. 12 - pg. 1220, l. 1.   
At the conclusion of its case in chief, the State amended the Information to
charge Mr. Thurlow in the alternative with first degree murder by aiding and
abetting in the crime.  Tr., pg. 1048, l. 12 - pg. 1049, l. 21.  The defense theory of the
case was that Mr. Thurlow was guilty only of accessory after the fact.  Defense
counsel told the jury in closing argument that, “I’m not going to lie to you here again
today.  He knew there was a murder committed and he didn’t tell. . . . He had to tell,
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he had to, and he failed to.”  Tr., pg. 1381, l. 10-14.  She concluded by telling the
jury, “He’s guilty of accessory after the fact.  That’s what he’s guilty of.”  Tr., pg.
1387, l. 15-16.  The jury found Mr. Thurlow guilty of first degree murder although
they did not designate whether they found that he personally killed Mr. West or
whether he aided and abetted Mr. Lewers in the commission of the crime. Tr., pg.
1400, l. 11-13.   
The district court sentenced Mr. Thurlow to a fixed-life term.  Tr., pg. 1404,
l.1 - pg.1442, l. 8.
2.  The direct appeal
Mr. Thurlow appealed.  He argued that the district court abused its discretion
in denying his request for appointed co-counsel and in imposing an excessive
sentence.  The Court of Appeals affirmed both the judgment and sentence.   State v.
Thurlow, 152 Idaho at 257, 269 P.3d at 814. 
3.  The post-conviction proceedings
Mr. Thurlow filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief.  R 15.  The court
appointed counsel.  R 52.  Appointed counsel took the deposition of trial attorney,
Linda Payne, and defense expert witness, Gaylen Warren.  See R 83-86.  Appointed
counsel then filed an Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which was
verified by Mr. Thurlow.  R 89-109.  Mr. Thurlow alleged he did not receive the
effective assistance of trial counsel.  The petition alleged five areas where trial
counsel’s performance was deficient.  Pertinent to this appeal was the allegation
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that “Petitioner was denied his Constitutional right to effective counsel when
Attorney Linda Payne failed to provide him with accurate information during plea
bargaining.  This prejudiced Mr. Thurlow’s case as he would have taken the initial
plea offer of ten (10) years instead of proceeding to trial.”  R 91; see also R 99.  The
Amended Petition alleged:
Mr. Thurlow contends that prior to trial, the state made an offer of ten
(10) years in prison in return for a plea of guilty to second degree
murder which he refused.  Mr. Thurlow asserts in his petition for post-
conviction relief that his attorney, Linda Payne, advised him that she
believed that he would be found guilty of Accessory after the Fact,
Idaho Code section 18-205, if he proceeded to trial.  The Accessory after
the Fact charge carries a maximum penalty of five (5) years.
R 100.  In support of this allegation, Mr. Thurlow attached to the Amended Petition
a complete copy of the trial transcript in the underlying criminal case, the
deposition transcripts of Gaylen Warren and Linda Payne, and a note handwritten
by Ms. Payne to Mr. Thurlow.  (These have been included as exhibits on appeal.  R
214.)  The note was written on a printed web-page from Casemaker which contains
the definition of accessories from I.C. § 18-205:
All persons are accessories who, having knowledge that a felony has
been committed:
(1) Willfully withhold or conceal it from a peace officer, judge,
magistrate, grand jury or trial jury; or
(2) Harbor and protect a person who committed such felony or
who has been charged with or convicted thereof.
Exhibit D; R 45.  The hand-written part of the note stated:
Kenny –
This is the crime that I believe you would/will be found guilty of if we
go to trial.  Maximum penalty is 5 yrs.  State v. Barnes is attached, It
  Counsel is likely referring to State v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 634, 826 P.2d 13462
(Ct. App. 1992), a Bonner Co. case where the defendant pleaded guilty to an
accessory after the fact charge in a murder case upon a factual basis that he failed
to notify the police after he became aware of the murder. 
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is a Bonner Co. Case + explains how little a person has to do to become
an accessory after the fact.  Thought you might be interested.
L — 
Id.   (A true and correct copy of the note is attached hereto as Appendix A.)2
Trial counsel stated at her deposition that “Kenny asked me at the very least
what he would be convicted of under the circumstances, at the very least.  And I
said, well, there an accessory after the fact, or words to that effect.”  She sent the
note as a follow up to that conversation.  Exhibit C (“Payne Deposition”), pg.17, l. 8-
15.  She said that “I honestly really tried to convince him to plead to second degree
murder because we were looking at maybe a maximum of ten years . . . with the
agreements that we were discussing.”  She also said that Mr. Thurlow refused to
plead guilty to second degree murder. “He absolutely insisted that he did not shoot
anyone and that he was going to testify at trial.  He never wavered from that right.” 
Id, pg. 19, l. 7-15.  Mr. Thurlow responded to her testimony by alleging that he
“adamantly disagrees with the ‘self-serving spin’ placed on the nature of plea
negotiations as characterized by attorney Payne in her deposition.  Due to her
assurances that he would most likely be convicted of Accessory after the Fact and
his faith in her legal experience, he decided to go to trial.”  R 103. 
The state filed an Answer, containing a general denial to the factual
allegations.  R 111-112.  It later filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and a brief 
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in support.  R 118-126.  The state argued the inaccurate plea information claim
should be dismissed because “[c]ontrary to Petitioner’s claims, Ms. Payne stated
that she tried to get her client to seriously consider the plea offer that was initially
given by the prosecution.  Mr. Thurlow was given that information but chose to go
to trial anyway.”  R 123-124.  The state did not argue that the specific allegations
did not state facts constituting deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984), but only argued that Mr. Thurlow’s allegation
of inaccurate information was disproved by trial counsel’s testimony.  R 123-124. 
Mr. Thurlow filed a brief in opposition to the state’s motion and argued that trial
counsel “advised him that she believed that he would be found guilty of Accessory
after the Fact, Idaho Code section 18-205, if he proceeded to trial.”  R 132.  “It
appears that Ms. Payne did feel that Mr. Thurlow would be convicted of Accessory
after the Fact from her written note . . . . She asked the judge to give an instruction
to the jury on that crime and he did so.”  R 133.  Mr. Thurlow repeated his
allegation that “[d]ue to her assurances that he would most likely be convicted of
Accessory after the Fact and his faith and trust in her legal experience, he decided
to proceed to trial.”  Id.  
After hearing argument, the court issued an opinion and order granting the
state’s motion.  It wrote:
Petitioner contends defense counsel told him she believed he would be
found guilty of accessory to murder if he went to trial, that the crime
was punishable by five (5) years in prison, and that he opted to go to
trial based on his trust in her legal expertise and experience.  In
12
deposition, attorney Payne testified she talked to Thurlow and
explained to him that under the law, he was guilty of the crime of
murder if he aided and abetted the crime.  Attorney Payne testified she
informed Petitioner a plea of guilty to second degree murder would
likely result in a sentence of ten (10) years rather than life, but that
Petitioner was adamant about going to trial.  Attorney Payne further
testified that she informed Petitioner the best he could hope for was to
be convicted of accessory to murder of he went to trial, and that at trial
she requested and received jury instructions for second degree murder
and accessory to murder.  The Court finds no evidence that disputes
attorney Payne’s testimony regarding her communications with
Petitioner Thurlow.  Therefore, the Court is unable to find she was
ineffective, as she communicated to Petitioner the offers from the State
and offered Petitioner an accurate legal analysis regarding the offers. 
R 176-177.  It issued a final judgment dismissing the case.  R 180.  A timely pro se
notice of appeal was filed.  R 197. 
III.  ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the court err in summarily dismissing the ineffective assitance claim that
trial counsel misinformed petitioner about the likely outcome of the trial causing
him to go to trial and reject the state’s plea offer?  
IV.  ARGUMENT
The district court erred by summarily dismissing the inaccurate
information claim.  There was a material issue of fact whether counsel
advised Mr. Thurlow he would only be convicted of accessory after the fact 
if he went to trial.
1.  Standard of review
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in
nature.  Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner must eventually prove by a
preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction
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relief is based. Unlike ordinary civil actions, a petition for post-conviction relief must
contain more than a short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a
complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Instead, a petition for post-conviction relief must be
verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner, and
affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached or
the petition must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the
petition.  That is to say, the petition must present or be accompanied by admissible
evidence supporting its allegations.  Takhsilov v. State, No. 42780, — Idaho —, —
P.3d —, 2016 WL 331371, at *1-2 (Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2016). 
Idaho Code § 19–4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for
post-conviction relief if it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits
submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  While the district court must construe
disputed facts in the petitioner's favor, it is not required to accept either the
petitioner’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
petitioner's conclusions of law. Id.  At the same time, the district court, as the trier of
fact, is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from
uncontroverted evidence. Id.  Such inferences will not be disturbed on appeal if the
uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify them. Id. 
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, the appellate court will apply
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the same standards utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s
admissible evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief.
Over questions of law, it exercises free review. Id.
2.  Why relief should be granted
A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel includes the
plea-bargaining process.  “During plea negotiations defendants are ‘entitled to the
effective assistance of competent counsel.’” Lafler v. Cooper, — U.S. —, 132 S. Ct.
1376, 1384 (2012), quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).  In
order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must
show: 1) the attorney’s performance was deficient and 2) that the petitioner was
prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). 
An attorney’s performance is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988).  
To establish prejudice in the context of plea negotiations a defendant must show the
outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice.  Lafler
v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct., at 1384.
The court erred when it dismissed the claim finding that Mr. Thurlow had not
provided any evidence to contradict trial counsel’s account of the advice she gave
regarding the likely outcome at trial.  R 176-177.  “A verified pleading that sets forth
evidentiary facts within the personal knowledge of the verifying signator is, in
substance, an affidavit and is accorded the same probative force as an affidavit.” 
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Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936, 120 P.3d 751, 754 (Ct. App. 2005), citing Mata
v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593, 861 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Ct. App.1993).  Here, the
Amended Petition contradicted counsel’s testimony when it alleged:
1. The state made an offer of ten (10) years in prison in return for a plea of
guilty to second degree murder.  
2.  Trial counsel advised Mr. Thurlow that she believed that he would be
found guilty of Accessory after the Fact, Idaho Code section 18-205, if he proceeded
to trial.
3.  He proceeded to trial because of trial counsel’s assurances that he would
most likely be convicted of Accessory after the Fact.
R 100; 103.  Further, Mr. Thurlow attached to the Amended Petition the note Ms.
Payne mailed to him.  The note conclusively proves that Ms. Payne informed Mr.
Thurlow that he “would/will be found guilty of [accessory after the fact] if we go to
trial.” And that the “[m]aximum penalty is 5 yrs.”  R 214; Appendix A to brief;
Exhibit D in record.  In order for the jury to find Mr. Thurlow guilty of that offense it
would have to first acquit him of both first and second degree murder.  
Counsel admitted sending the note to Mr. Thurlow in her deposition.  Payne
Deposition, pg. 16, l. 20 - pg. 17, l. 20.  While counsel asserted that the note was
being “taken out of context,” she did not explain how the line “This is the crime that
I believe you would/will be found guilty of if we go to trial” could be construed to
mean that such a conviction was  “the very least he would be convicted of under the
circumstance,” as she claimed.  Id., pg. 17, l. 10-15.  Even if Ms. Payne meant to tell
Mr. Thurlow that an accessory after the fact verdict was the best possible outcome,
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her note plainly states that she believes it will be the outcome.  And, Mr. Thurlow
alleged that he decided to go to trial because of that advice.  Thus, even if the note
was misunderstood by Mr. Thurlow, it still led to his rejection of the plea offer.  R
103.
Contrary to the court’s statement, Mr. Thurlow produced evidence that: 1)
counsel advised him that he would only be found guilty of accessory after the fact
and 2) that he rejected the plea offer based upon that advice.  Further, counsel
testified that the state offered to permit Mr. Thurlow to plead to second degree
murder.  Id., pg. 18, l. 23-24.  The public record shows the co-defendant pleaded to
first degree murder and received a twenty year fixed sentence while Mr. Thurlow is
serving a fixed life sentence.  State v. Thurlow, supra; State v. Lewers, supra. 
This evidence created a material question of fact regarding whether Ms.
Payne’s performance was deficient by giving inaccurate advice (whether
intentionally or inadvertently) about the likely outcome of the trial.  Further, it
seems clear that Mr. Thurlow’s sentence for second degree murder under the plea
offer would not exceed his co-defendant’s sentence of twenty years for first degree
murder.  It is worth noting that the state did not dispute that Mr. Thurlow’s
allegations, if true, would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  It only
disputed whether the allegations were true. Consequently, Mr. Thurlow need not
address those potential arguments at this time as he has not been given proper
notice under I.C. § 19-4906.  Caldwell v. State, 159 Idaho 233, 358 P.3d 794, 799 (Ct.
17
App. 2015), review denied (Oct. 30, 2015) (“Absent such notice, we may not affirm on
a theory other than that upon which the district court based the summary
dismissal.”) Here, the court erred by failing to consider the evidence Mr. Thurlow
presented on the issue which contradicted defense counsel’s testimony and
established a claim.  Consequently, the order summarily dismissing the claim should
be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
V.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Turlow asks this Court to vacate the
summary dismissal of the amended petition in part and remand the matter for
further proceedings.  
Respectfully submitted this 19  day of February, 2016.th
____/s/_____________________
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Kenneth Thurlow
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